Reynold Johnson v. Levan Town and Robert Shepherd : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Reynold Johnson v. Levan Town and Robert
Shepherd : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Reynold Johnson; Pro Se; Plaintiff/Appellant.
Denton M. Hatch; Attorney for Levan Town Defendants/Appellees.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Johnson v. Town and Shepard, No. 20051039 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6137
DENTON M, HATCH, #1413 
Attorney for Levan Town 
128 West 900 North, Suite C 
Spanish Fork. UT 84660 
Phone (801) 794-3852 
Fax (801) 794-3859 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Reynold Johnson, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
Levan Town and Robert Shepherd, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPEHlMBfiT 
Case No. 2005103H 
This proceeding is an appeal from the final order issued by the honorable Judge 
Donald J. Eyre of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Juab County. 
Reynold Johnson, pro se 
P.O. Box 301 
Levan, Utah 84639 
Phone: (435) 623-0533 
Denton M. Hatch 
129 West 900 North Suite C 
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 
Phone: (801) 794-3852 
Fax: (801) 794-3B59 
Plaintiff/Appellant Attorney for Levan Town 
Defendants/Appellees 
Table of Contents 
Parties to This Proceeding. ,3 
Table of Authorities..... 3 
Statement of Jurisdiction. , „ ,4 
Statement of the €as< 
Summary of Argument., , , ,5 
_£a 
Argument. 
I. The only reviewable issue in this case is the trial court's 
denial of Reynold Johnson's Motion To Set Aside Order 
Dismissing Complaint ., .8 
II. The trial court did not commit reversible error in 
denying Johnson's 60(b) motion because the issues 
raised in the motion are outside the scope of Rule 60(b) 
and because there is no evidence that the trial court 
abused its discretion 13 
III. As an alternative argument, the issues raised in Mr. 
Johnson's brief should be decided in favor of Levan 
Town because Mr. Johnson failed to marshal the 
evidence 
IV Fhe issues in Mr. Johnson's brief should be decided in 
favor of Levan Town because Mr. Johnson did not 
provide adequate citations in his brief...., .....20 
V. I!ii» trial court did not commit reversible error in 
following the set back evidence of Levan Town and not 
the evidence of Mr. Johnson 23 
VI. Fhe Court should not address Mr. Johnson's issues 
numbered three and six because the issues were not 
preserved in the trial court. 
Conclusior 25 
2 
Parties to the Proceeding 
The parties to this proceeding are the same parties appearing in the trial 
court. The Plaintiff and appellant is Reynold Johnson. Mr. Johnson is representing 
himself. The Defendant and appellee is Levan Town. Levan Town is represented 
by Denton M. Hatch. 
Table of Authorities 
Chen v. Stewart 2004 UT 82. 100 P.3d 1177 20 
Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987) 9,23,24 
Fisher v. Bvbee. 2004 UT 92. 104 P.3d 1198 14,16 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n. 945 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). cert, denied. 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997) 17 
Lanse v. Ebv. 2006 UT App. 118. 133 P.3d 451. no cert, filed 11, 16 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932. 935-36 (Utah 1994) 24 
State v. Vieil. 661 P.2d 947 (Utah 1983) 23 
State ex rel. MM. v. State of Utah. 2003 UT 54. 82 P.3d 1104 9 
Utah R. APP. P. 4(a) 9 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) 25 
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 14 
West One Bank. Utah v. Life Ins. Co.. 887 P.2d 880 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994). no cert, filed 17, 18 
3 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
Statement of the Case 
This case was initiated by appellant, Reynold Johnson against appellees, 
Levan Town through a complaint dated April 7, 2004. (R. at 8.) Both parties 
moved for summary judgment and the trial court ruled in favor of Levan Town on 
two issues. (R. at 247.) First, the trial court ruled that Levan Town had properly 
denied Reynold Johnson a certificate of occupancy. (R. at 247.) Second, the trial 
court ruled that the Town's setback ordinance was enacted in accordance with 
Utah law. (R. at 247.) The trial court refused to grant summary judgment for either 
party on the issue of discriminatory enforcement of the setback ordinance because 
the court determined there were issues of material fact to be decided. (R. at 246.) 
After a trial, in an order dated September 12, 2005, the court determined that 
Levan Town had not enforced the setback ordinance in a discriminatory manner 
and dismissed the plaintiffs complaint. (R. at 571.) Mr. Johnson then filed a 
motion for relief from judgment on September 28, 2005. (R. at 578). The motion 
was denied in an order issued by the trial court on October 18, 2005. (R. at 595.) 
Mr. Johnson then filed a notice of appeal on November 5, 2005. (R. at 597.) 
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Summary of Arguments 
I. The only reviewable issue in this case is the trial court's denial of 
Reynold Johnson's Rule 60(b) motion. 
Mr. Johnson filed an untimely notice of appeal, and thus the scope of his 
appeal is limited. Mr. Johnson did not file a notice of appeal until more than thirty 
days after the final order was entered. (R. at 597.) All the issues contained in Mr. 
Johnson's brief are related to orders from which he did not file a timely appeal. 
Because untimely filings strip appellate court of jurisdiction, the issues in Mr. 
Johnson's brief cannot be heard. While Mr. Johnson did file a timely notice of 
appeal from the order denying his Rule 60(b) motion, the scope of his appeal is 
necessarily limited to a review of the trial court's denial of this motion. 
II. The trial court did not commit reversible error in denying Mr. 
Johnson's 60(b) motion because the issues raised in the motion are 
outside the scope of Rule 60(b) and because there is no evidence that 
the trial court abused its discretion. 
If this Court addresses the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying 
Mr. Johnson's Rule 60(b) motion, even though the issue was not raised in his 
brief, the trial court's denial must stand. First, the denial must stand because the 
motion argues that the trial court made mistakes throughout the case. However, 
mistakes of law by a trial judge are outside the scope of Rule 60(b) motions, and 
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therefore the motion was properly denied. Second, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion. Abuse of discretion is a difficult standard to 
prove, and Mr. Johnson has not provided any argument as to how the trial court 
abused its discretion. 
III. If this Court does not limit the issues of this appeal to the denial of 
Mr. Johnson's Rule 60(b) motion, the issues raised in Mr. Johnson's 
brief must be decided in favor of Levan Town because Mr. Johnson 
failed to marshal the evidence. 
If appellants challenge the factual findings of a trial court they must 
marshal the evidence of each challenged finding. In this appeal Mr. Johnson 
challenges three factual findings of the trial court, but fails to properly marshal the 
evidence on any of the findings. On the first two findings Mr. Johnson lists some, 
but not all of the evidence in favor of the findings. However, on both issues Mr. 
Johnson does not present the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court, 
but rather in a light most favorable to himself. On the third issue Mr. Johnson does 
not list any of the evidence that supported the trial court's finding. Because Mr. 
Johnson failed to marshal the evidence the Court should assume that the 
challenged findings were correct. 
IV. The trial court's ruling cannot be overturned because Mr. Johnson 
did not provide adequate citations to the record in his brief. 
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When a party fails to cite to the record, the appellate court will assume that 
the trial court's rulings are correct. Mr. Johnson failed to cite to the record in any 
part of his brief, and thus, the court should assume that the trial court's rulings 
were correct on all issues. 
V. The trial court did not commit reversible error in following the set 
back evidence of Levan Town and not the evidence of Mr. Johnson. 
This issue involves a factual finding made by the trial court. Namely, that 
setback measurements would be determined by Levan Town's method of 
measuring from historic fence lines. Evidence was produced by Levan Town 
showing that their method of measurement was the most accurate. This evidence 
supports the trial court finding, and thus the finding was not clearly erroneous 
because it is supported by the record. 
VI. The Court should not address Mr. Johnson's issues numbered three 
and six because the issues were not preserved in the trial court. 
In order to raise an issue on appeal, a party must preserve the issue in the 
trial court. Two of the issues asserted in Mr. Johnson's brief (an invalid zoning 
plan and Levan Town's method of issuing building permits) were not preserved in 
the trial court. Neither issue was clearly brought to the attention of the trial court, 
and neither issue had proper legal citations. Additionally, the trial court never 
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ruled on either issue, and Mr. Johnson did not fulfill his responsibility to request 
the trial court rule on the issues. 
Ai gument 
The first two issues of this brief will deal with Reynold Johnson's Motion 
To Set Aside Order Dismissing Complaint. 'While it is somewhat unclear whether 
M: j^nn^-;; filed this motic . .. .<.; A.... •-•...*::%.. • •• • . * * il 
n<v*.^ i *?v ::>ouon was filed under Rule 60(b) because if the motion was filed 
under Rule 59(a) it would have been untimely and properly denied by the trial 
COlirr . . ; \ A .:. ltyt.: A . . • » ! . , . _ „ • ' * ' u r : - ' / : ; • 
iTH : - a Rule 60(b) motion. 
I. The only reviewable issue in this ease is the trial court's denial of 
Reynold JonnsiA .„uie ou^u; motion. 
The issues asserted b\ Reynold Johnson in his brief are not reviewable for 
two reasons. First, Mr. Johnson's notice of appeal was not filed on time. Second, 
motions rruuu L::M^. . - i* ' : ;% • t.. " "\)<r •- » 's 
mistakes of law. 
Timely Appeals 
When a pail;, wishes tu appeal .1 trial mil . Iniiil nnler thai p«n1\ inir-l fill"* 
a notice of appeal within thirty days of the order. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Once the 
thirty day time requirement has lapsed, and no extension is granted, appellate 
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courts no longer have jurisdiction. State ex rel MM. v. State ofUtah^ 2003 UT 54, 
1[3. 82P.3d 1104. While there are four types of motions that will toll the thirty-
day time requirement, 60(b) motions do not. Fackrell v. FackrelL 740 P.2d 1318, 
1319 (Utah 1987). 
When an appellant files a notice of appeal more than thirty days after a final 
order, and makes only a rule 60(b) motion, the decisions made in the final order 
cannot be asserted on appeal. Id. at 1318. In Fackrell v. Fackrell former spouses 
litigated over the amount of child support to be paid by the father. Id. The trial 
court ruled against the father and he filed a "motion to reconsider." Id. at 1319. 
The motion was denied and more than thirty days after the final order was entered, 
the father filed a notice of appeal. See Id. On appeal the Supreme Court stated it 
was unclear if the father's motion was brought under Rule 59(a) or Rule 60(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. However, the Supreme Court determined 
that under either rule it could not hear the issues asserted by the father because 
they involved the merits of the trial court's original order. See id. 
If the motion is treated as one under Rule 59, it was filed later than ten 
days after the entry of the final judgment and was therefore properly 
rejected by the trial court. . . . Treating the motion under Rule 60(b)(1) 
or (7) likewise does not save this appeal . . . A Rule 60(b) motion does 
not extend or toll the thirty-day period in which appeals in the original 
action must be filed. . . . We therefore cannot consider father's attack 
on the order refusing to modify child support and decide only the issue 
of whether it was error for the district court judge to have rejected 
father's motion. 
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ft / (citation omitted). 
Turning to the present case, all of the issues contained in Mr. Johnson's 
brief cannot not DO assorted JL ~;a.;.a.. . a .au._. ,..*. ' <a - aaa '''-"v 
fohnson did not make a timeh apnea!. All die issues asserted in Mr. 
Johnson's brief involve the trial court's order dismissing Mr. Johnson's complaint 
and the order granting summary judgment :a =.:• . • ,....;.. 
Vpi-»' r* '~u- - - M **: • * the brief should not be heard by this Court 
because Mr. Johnson did not file a timely notice of appeal from, the trial court's 
order. I he order dismissing \ i ; . .aaii.oun > ,:.;ir.piia:ii • a- .n.cio. ?o: ,.-... •:•• 
'." 2!H • " * Irh- ;o- aouce of appeal was not sent in until 
November 5, 2005 (R. at 5^"\ > Further, Mr. Johnson did not request an extension 
of time to iwc a aoiiee o; appeal. *. .*:.. ,ohnson waniea ;o appea: 3i 01 n t! le order 
.i!-!r:s;:r:. - - : aroLaaa a.-- n^-iVr T ^ •-.- ua 'October 13, 20U5 or at least have 
filed for an extension by November I 1, 2005. Mr. Johnson, ho\ve\er, did not do 
either of these. 
W<1.' u"'^ * • ; a :, ^ a.,, nut file a time!; anneal from the order that 
dismissed his complaint, the only re\ iewable issue is whether the trial court, erred 
in denving ti:s viouon :o .ac, .\.aue a-^at I Msinissmg I omplamt. lust a:- the 
father in .'•"' irkral! Mr. Johnson made a motion that arguably could have been 
brought under Rule 59(a) or 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, 
just as the father's motion, Mr. Johnson's was not filed ten days from the entry of 
the final order. Further, if made under Rule 60(b) Mr. Johnson's motion did not 
toll the thirty-day time requirement. Thus, as stated by the Fackrell court "We 
therefore . . . . decide only the issue of whether it was error for the district court 
judge to have rejected [the] motion." Id. 
In conclusion, because Mr. Johnson did not file a notice of appeal within 
thirty days after the order dismissing his complaint was entered, and because he 
did not receive an extension, he cannot challenge any aspect of the order because 
his late filing strips this Court of jurisdiction. While Mr. Johnson's Rule 60(b) 
motion can be appealed from, the motion did not extend the time for appealing 
from the order dismissing his complaint because Rule 60(b) motions do not have a 
tolling effect. Thus, the scope of this appeal is limited to a review of the trial 
court's denial of Mr. Johnson's motion. 
Scope of Review of Rule 60(b) Motions 
When a party is limited to appealing a trial court's denial of their rule 60(b) 
motion, they cannot assert issues involving mistakes of law. Lange v. Eby< 2006 
UTApp. 118,117, 133 P3d45l.no cert, filed. Appeals from Rule 60(b) motions 
do not allow appellate courts to reach the merits of the underlying trial court 
judgment because 60(b) motions would become a substitute for timely appeals. Id. 
11 
When an appellant appeals from the denial of a Rule 60(h) morion, issues 
not related to the denial will not be heard. In Lange v coy the oni\ timely appeal 
rircu ,\> v w . i\ • ,:- .^ u u , .:. * • -i . - ; * - • ',% • :% i • * '• < r 1 •' "\ -.or on 
appeal Mr. Eby tried to raise issues involving the underlying judgment of the trial 
court (the trial court's failure to credit Mr. Eby with a settlement amount). Id. at f 
5. T h e * , ... '. A : ; p c ; ; c i u b ^ . . •. :•:."•:- • *rt*: - : - : e * " "»"- * •' » - ~vl 
within the -.:ooe of Mr. Ebv \ appeal and because, if heard, the requirement of 
timely appeals would be e;ra;m\ ented. See Id. a t v ~* 
Aspre\icusi\ rr.cr.iione... _i. •-. -..i. .M;;CJ ,;s.*crte \'^ R ^ ' ^ ' d "• *ir> • • 
arrval -.r.\ Ke the merits of the trial court's underlying judgment. Just as Mr. Eby 
in Lange v. Eby, Mr. Johnson asserts issues that are outside the scope of an appeal 
artv.i —von made is from the trial court's denial of his Rule o0(bj motion. 
Issues such as summary judgment, valid zoning ordinances, arbitrary enforcement, 
evidence, and methou^ 01 . ^ u n . , _ \zw\ .:> . i -.. * • e 
nothing to do with whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mr. 
Johnson's motion and should not be heard by this Court'. To ensure that \ Ir 
Johns r r : - / . • • .V.M* r • . * : ; . • * . • * *•• - - . ^ n r :u 
this Court should not address the issues contained in Mr; Johnson's brief. At most, 
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this Court should decide whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Johnson's 
motion. 
II. The trial court did not commit reversible error in denying Mr. 
Johnson's 60(b) motion because the issues raised in the motion are 
outside the scope of Rule 60(b) and because there is no evidence that 
the trial court abused its discretion. 
Because Mr. Johnson failed to raise this issue in his brief, the Court should 
not hear it. However, if the Court decides to entertain the issue, the trial court's 
ruling should be upheld for two reasons. First, the ruling should be upheld because 
an incorrect application of law by a trial court judge is not the type of mistake 
covered under Rule 60(b). Second the ruling should be upheld because the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Johnson's motion. 
Relief From Judgment Due to Mistake of a Judge 
Under Rule 60(b) a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, 
or proceeding for the following six reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial; (3) fraud, misrepresentation or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based 
has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
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judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
While a party can use mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect as 
grounds for relief from judgment, such conduct relates to the activities of counsel 
and parties, but rarely extends the actions of judges. Fisher v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, 
f 12, 104 P.3d 1198. A wrong decision by a trial court on a point of law is not a 
mistake for which relief from judgment is granted. Id. 
A Rule 60(b) motion asking for relief from judgment based on a trial 
court's mistake of law will not be granted. Id. at f 6, 13. In Fisher v. Bybee Mr. 
and Mrs. Fisher sought to extend a judgment they had against Mr. Bybee. Id. at % 
3. An extension was granted by one trial court judge and Mr. Bybee filed a Rule 
60(b) motion stating that the trial court wrongly gave an extension. Id. at ^ 4-5. 
Another trial court judge agreed that the extension was improperly given, but 
would not grant Mr. Bybee's motion because the mistake asserted was not within 
the meaning of Rule 60(b). Id. at f 6. Mr. Bybee appealed and the Supreme Court 
affirmed. Id. atf 13. 
Mr. Johnson's affidavit supporting his Rule 60(b) motion does not clearly 
state for which of the six reasons listed in Rule 60(b) his motion should be 
granted. However, the only fitting reason would be mistake. In his affidavit Mr. 
Johnson merely lists all the ways in which the trial court erred throughout the 
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course of the case. (R. at 580-81.) The affidavit contains nothing that would show 
excusable neglect or surprise on his part. (R. at 580-81.) The affidavit does not 
reveal any newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered in time 
to move for a new trial. (R at 580-81.) Additionally, the affidavit does not allege 
any instances of fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct by the Town of Levan. 
(R. at 580-81.) Further, there are no reasons given for why the judgment is void or 
why the judgment has been satisfied. (R. at 580-81.) Lastly, there are no 
statements in the affidavit that assert any other compelling reason for why relief 
from the judgment should be granted. (R. at 580-81.) Thus, the only section of the 
Rule 60(b) that applies to the statements made in Mr. Johnson's affidavit is that of 
mistake. However, Mr. Johnson's affidavit does not allege mistakes made by 
himself, but rather mistakes made by the trial court. 
Because Mr. Johnson asked for relief from judgment based on the trial 
court's mistakes and not his own, his 60(b) motion was properly denied. As 
previously discussed, the type of mistakes provided for in 60(b)(2) relate to 
mistakes of parties and not mistakes of judges. Just as Mr. Bybee's motion in 
Fisher v. By bee, the mistakes alleged in Mr. Johnson's affidavit do not fall within 
the scope of Rule 60(b), and thus cannot be granted. 
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Abuse of Discretion 
Even if this Court finds that the mistakes asserted by Mr. Johnson were 
properly raised in a 60(b) motion, the trial court's denial should be upheld because 
the court did not abuse its discretion. In reviewing trial court rulings on 60(b) 
motions appellate courts only overturn the rulings if there is a clear abuse of 
discretion. Lange, 2006 UT App. at f 6. Great deference is given to trial court 
rulings on 60(b) motions and the rulings are rarely disturbed. See Fisher, 2004 UT 
at 17. 
The outcome of Rule 60(b) motions are rarely vulnerable to attack. 
We grant broad discretion to trial court's rule 60(b) rulings because 
most are equitable in nature, saturated with facts, and call upon 
judges to apply fundamental principles of fairness that do not 
easily lend themselves to appellate review. 
Id. The reasons given in Mr. Johnson's affidavit for why he should receive 
relief from the judgment do not show that the trial court abused its discretion. The 
affidavit merely reiterates arguments that Mr. Johnson had previously made to the 
trial court. (R. at 580-81.) Because the standard of review on this issue requires 
great deference to the trial court, and because the affidavit does not provide any 
evidence that the trial court abused its discretion, the ruling should not be 
disturbed. 
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III. As an alternative argument1 this Court should deny issues three and 
six in Mr. Johnson's brief because the issues were not preserved in 
the trial court. 
Issues that are not preserved in the trial court will not be heard for the first 
time on appeal. Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm 'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d449 (Utah 1997). An issue is not preserved 
unless it is sufficiently raised before the trial court. Id. at 129-30. For an issue to 
be sufficiently raised three requirements must be met. Id. at 130. First, the issue 
must be timely raised. Id. Second, the issue must be stated so as to raise a level of 
consciousness in the trial court. Id. Third, there must be supporting evidence or 
relevant legal authority supporting the issue. Id. "The mere mention of an issue in 
the pleadings . . . is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus insufficient to 
preserve the issue for appeal." West One Bank, Utah v. Life Ins. Co., 887 P.2d 880, 
882 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), no cert, filed. If a trial court fails to rule on an issue, the 
party raising the issue has the responsibility to bring the failure to the trial court's 
attention. Hart, 945 P.2d at 130. 
The issue of a valid zoning plan/building code cannot be raised on appeal 
because Mr. Johnson did not raise the issue before the trial court. There are only 
two references to Levan Town's Building Code in any of Mr. Johnson's pleadings. 
1
 Sections I and II of this brief argue that the scope of Mr. Johnson's appeal should be limited to a review of 
the trial court's denial of Reynold Johnson's 60(b) motion. However, if the Court chooses not to limit the 
appeal, sections III through VI address alternative arguments. 
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The first is a footnote in Mr. Johnson's memorandum supporting his motion for 
summary judgment. (R. at 117.) The footnote states that "Plaintiff has been unable 
to determine when the Building Code was passed and whether the statutory 
requirements were met relative to its passage." (R. at 117.) This one statement 
does not satisfy the three requirements set forth in Hart v. Salt Lake County 
Comm 'n. While the statement was filed on time (fulfilling the first requirement), it 
fails to meet the other two requirements. First, this one statement would not raise a 
level of consciousness in the trial court regarding the issue of a valid Building 
Code. The statement mentions in passing that the plaintiff was unable to determine 
when the Building Code was passed; it does not state that the plaintiff was 
contesting its validity. Second, there is no further argument with supporting 
authority made in the memorandum about why the Town's Building Code was not 
properly enacted. At most, the statement in the footnote makes mention of the 
building code issue. However, as stated in West One Bank, 'The mere mention of 
an issue in the pleadings . . . is insufficient to raise an issue at trial and thus 
insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal." West One Bank, 887 P.2d at 882. 
The second reference to the invalid building code was made in Mr. 
Johnson's Objection To Proposed Order and Ruling. While the objection states 
that Levan Town did not have a valid zoning ordinance in place, it is not supported 
with citations to legal authority. (R. at 283-87.) Further, the argument was not 
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supported by evidence. Mr. Johnson did not produce affidavits or other types of 
evidence showing that the zoning plan and building code were not properly 
enacted. The statements in the objection are merely allegations made by Mr. 
Johnson. Additionally, the issue was never decided by the trial court2 and Mr. 
Johnson failed to fulfill his responsibility to call the trial court's attention to this 
failure. 
The issue of Levan Town's building permit procedures should also not be 
heard on appeal because it was not preserved in the trial court. While Mr. Johnson 
argued that Levan Town's procedures were unfair, he did not cite a single legal 
authority showing the Town's procedures were illegal, unconstitutional, or 
improper. (R. at 287.) As with the previous issue, this issue was never ruled on by 
the trial court (R. at 183, 247.) and Mr. Johnson failed to fulfill his responsibility 
to call the trial court's attention to its failure. 
In short, Mr. Johnson asks this Court to decide whether or not the trial 
court erred in determining that Levan Town had a valid zoning plan in place at the 
time the set-back ordinance was enacted. (Appellant's Br. 4.) Mr. Johnson also 
asks this Court to decide if the trial court erred in allowing Levan Town's method 
of issuing building permits. (Appellant's Br. 5.) However, since Mr. Johnson did 
not raise either issue at the trial court level, he should not be allowed to do so now. 
2
 The only issue decided by the trial court was that Levan Town's setback ordinance was valid. The court 
never ruled on whether Levan Town had a valid zoning plan/building code in place at the time the set-back 
ordinance was enacted. (R. at 247.) 
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The trial court did not have a chance to hear either issue, and hence it could not 
have erred in determining them. 
IV. The issues raised in Mr. Johnson's brief must be decided in favor of 
Levan Town because Mr. Johnson failed to marshal the evidence. 
When an appellant presents issues of fact for review on appeal, the 
appellant has a duty to marshal the evidence. Utah. R. App. P. 24(a)(9). If the 
appellant fails to satisfy the marshalling requirement the appellate court must 
assume that the trial court's findings are correct. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f^ 
76, 100 P.3d 1177. In order to properly discharge the marshaling requirement, an 
appellant must list all of the evidence presented at trial that supports the disputed 
finding. Id. at f 77. An exhaustive review of all the evidence is not proper; the 
party must give a precisely focused summary of all the evidence supporting the 
trial court's finding. Id. Further, the evidence must be presented in a light most 
favorable to the trial court; not in a light most favorable to the appellant. Id. at f 
78. 
In the present case, Mr. Johnson has failed to meet his burden of 
marshalling the evidence. Three of the issues in Mr. Johnson's brief challenge the 
trial court's factual findings, and for all three issues Mr. Johnson fails to list all of 
the evidence that supports the challenged findings. 
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The first challenged finding is whether the trial court erred in determining 
that the ordinance establishing setback requirements was properly enacted.3 
(Appellant's Br. 4.) There was a significant amount of evidence in the record 
which supports this finding. First, Levan presented the minutes from two city 
council meetings wherein Golden Mangelson made a motion requiring properties 
to be thirty feet from any city street. (R. at 104, 102.) The motion was seconded an 
approved by all other council members attending the meeting. (R. at 104, 102.) 
Second, Levan presented the minutes from a third council meeting where an 
ordinance describing the setback requirements was passed. (R. at 101.) Third, 
Levan provided an affidavit by Mayor Golden Mangelson which stated that there 
was a public hearing held on the ordinance, that there was 15 days notice given of 
the hearing, that the ordinance was approved by a planning commission and then 
submitted to the City Council for adoption, and that Levan Town complied will all 
state requirements when it enacted the setback ordinance. (R. at 155-56.) Fourth, 
Levan provided a document signed by clerk, Ann W. Stowell, which stated that 
the setback ordinance was adopted by the Town and posted in three public places. 
(R. at 216). All of the foregoing evidence supports the trial court's rulings in favor 
of Levan Town. However, Mr. Johnson failed to list all the details of the evidence 
in his brief (Appellant's Br 18-30), and thus, failed to meet his duty to marshal the 
3
 Mr. Johnson's issue number three is not stated clearly, but Levan Town has interpreted it as asserting that 
both the setback ordinance and the zoning plan were not properly enacted. The zoning plan issue was 
already presented and this secnon will discuss the ordinance issue. 
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evidence. Further, the evidence included in Mr. Johnson's brief is not stated in a 
light most favorable to the trial court, but rather in a light most favorable to Mr. 
Johnson. (Appellant's Br. 18-30.) Thus, Mr. Johnson failed on two accounts to 
marshal the evidence supporting the first challenged finding. 
The second challenged factual finding is whether the trial court erred in 
determining that the set back ordinance was not enforced arbitrarily. Levan Town 
provided evidence that there was no arbitrary enforcement from three sources. 
First, an affidavit from Golden Mangelson (R. at) Second, Robert Shepard's 
testimony at trial. (Bench Trial Tr. 2.) Third, Mike Kramer's testimony at trial. 
(Bench Trial Tr. 3.) Mr. Johnson briefly mentions that the Town stated it did not 
intentionally discriminate. (Appellant's Br. 33.) However, in his brief, Mr. 
Johnson did not state the names of the witnesses testifying, nor did he list the 
procedures they used to avoid discrimination. (Appellant's Br. 33.) (Bench Trial 
Tr. 43, 44, 48-49, 59.) Further, Mr. Johnson did not present the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the trial court, but rather in a light most favorable to himself. 
Mr. Johnson's brief states, "The Town states that there has been no intentional 
discrimination. But admits to known violations of noncompliant properties 
receiving building permits. Can there be a better example of arbitrary enforcement 
or non-existent enforcement for the ordinance of setback than which the Town 
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uses." (Appellant's Br. 33.) Thus, on this factual finding Mr. Johnson also failed to 
marshal the evidence on two accounts. 
The third challenged finding is the setback measurement method used to 
determine violations of the set-back ordinance. Mr. Johnson does not cite any 
evidence in favor of the trial court's finding on this issue. (Appellant's Br. 30-35.) 
Levan Town had two witnesses (Robert Shepard and Mike Kramer) testify at trial 
that measuring property setbacks from the fence-line was both the best and most 
established way to measure. (Bench Trial Tr. 44-45, 49, 98, 103.) Because Mr. 
Johnson does not present any of this evidence in his brief, he has failed to marshal 
the evidence and the trial court's finding should be upheld. 
V. The issues in Mr. Johnson's Brief should be decided in favor of 
Levan Town because Mr, Johnson did not provide adequate 
citations to the record in his brief. 
When a party fails to make proper citations to the record in their brief, the 
judgment of the lower court is presumed to be correct. Fackrell v. Fackrelj 740 
P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987). Contra State v. Vml 661 P.2d 947, 948 (Utah 
1983). 
When a person chooses to represent themselves pro se, they are not excused 
from making proper citations to the record. In Fackrell v. Fackrell the father 
represented himself in action contesting the amount of child support that he had to 
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pay. Id, On appeal, the father failed to cite to the record in his brief. Id, Because of 
this failure the court ruled that the trial court's judgment was presumed correct. Id. 
In the present case, the trial court's judgment must be presumed to be 
correct because Mr. Johnson made almost no attempt to cite to the record. 
(Appellant's Br. 8-41.) While Mr. Johnson is representing himself in this appeal, 
his pro se status does not relieve him of the citation requirements. See Fackrell, 
740 P.2d at 1319. Nowhere in Mr. Johnson's brief does he cite to the trial court 
record; the only citations attempted are made to exhibits and other documents. 
(Appellant's Br. 8-41.) Because there was virtually no effort made on the part of 
Mr. Johnson to cite to the record, the trial court's findings should be considered 
correct. 
VI. The trial court did not commit reversible error in following the set 
back evidence of Levan Town and not the evidence of Reynold 
Johnson. 
Factual findings determined by the trial court will not be overturned unless 
they are clearly erroneous. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). For a 
reviewing court to find error, the findings of the trial court must not be supported 
by the record. Id. The clearly erroneous standard gives a high amount of deference 
to the decisions of the trial court. Id. at 936. 
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In the present case, the trial court's decision to follow the setback 
measurement method of Levan Town was not clearly erroneous. In a bench trial 
the judge becomes the fact finder and is in a position to hear all of the evidence 
and decide which evidence to accept and which to reject. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a). The trial court chose to rely on the measurement procedures of Levan Town 
as the most adequate way to determine setback measurements. The trial court had 
to make a decision one way or another and there was ample evidence in the record 
showing Levan Town's method was the most reliable method due to inconsistent 
street widths. (R. at 541-42.) Thus, the finding was not clearly erroneous because 
it is adequately supported by the record. 
Conclusion 
All of the issues raised in Mr. Johnson's brief should not be heard by this 
Court because the time for raising such issues lapsed before Mr. Johnson filed his 
notice of appeal. The only issue that could be timely raised was the trial court's 
denial of Mr. Johnson's Rule 60(b) motion. However, Mr. Johnson failed to assert 
this issue on appeal and thus, the court should not hear it. If the Court does address 
the trial court's denial of Mr. Johnson's 60(b) motion, the ruling should not be 
overturned because the reasons raised in the motion are not within the scope of 
Rule 60(b) and because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion. If the Court does not limit the issues in this appeal to the trial court's 
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denial of Mr. Johnson's 60(b) motion, all issues asserted in Mr. Johnson's brief 
should be decided in favor of Levan Town because Mr. Johnson failed to marshal 
the evidence, failed to cite to the record, and failed to preserve two of the issues in 
the trial court. 
Dated this £ 7 day of July 2006. 
Denton M. Hatch 
Attorney for Levan Town 
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